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SUBJECT: EASTERN DRC NOTES - MARCH 26: FURTHER ANALYSIS OF
GDRC-CNDP AGREEMENT

¶1. (U) The items contained in this report consist principally of spot information from various sources. This report is not exhaustive, nor can all the information contained therein be confirmed at this time.

Aftermath of GDRC-CNDP Agreement

¶2. (SBU) A number of our contacts have characterized the signing of the agreement between the GDRC and the CNDP and between the GDRC and the other armed groups on March 23 as the formal end of a conflict that began with the original emergence of the CNDP. Others are less optimistic, noting that the North and South Kivu armed groups are generally unhappy because they felt pressured to sign an agreement they had no hand in drafting, and because they feel the CNDP has received preferential treatment. They note as well that the FDLR has not been significantly weakened and has returned to many areas that it had abandoned when the RDF swept through North Kivu. Negotiations over the past several weeks have been a private affair between the CNDP and the GDRC, although it is not even clear that the CNDP rank and file support the agreement. At least 4,500 CNDP fighters have been "integrated" but many remain in their former positions with only a change in uniform.

¶3. (SBU) Comment: Despite widespread discontent, it seems clear that the GDRC-CNDP agreement did bring about at least one significant outcome: it brought the international mediation of Obasanjo and Mkapa to a close. The GDRC, clearly uncomfortable with Obasanjo's interpretation of his mandate to effect change in the DRC, can now handle negotiations without what it views as UN and AU interference. It would also appear that the international community in general has been marginalized, in stark contrast with the Goma conference in January 2008. If the agreement holds, the GDRC is a clear winner, having made few commitments or concessions. End Comment.

Security Situation in the Kivus

¶4. (SBU) A rivalry between two separate FARDC units in Haut Uele led to a recent shooting incident that left one FARDC soldier dead. Separately, FDLR fighters attacked a FARDC base in the village of Kisheshe (north of Tongo) on the night of March 22. Two FDLR and one FARDC soldier were reportedly killed in the shoot-out. In addition, MONUC has confirmed that the FDLR burned seven homes last week in Bunyakiri in South Kivu. Elements of the FARDC 85th brigade are scheduled to deploy to the area this week.

¶5. (SBU) A PARECO commander in the vicinity of Pinga, General Ntansibanga, has urged his fighters to reject integration with the FARDC. According to MONUC briefers, he has threatened to join up with FDLR forces and fight against the integrated FARDC (Comment: Diplomats in Goma are unfamiliar with this general, but his dissatisfaction with the integration process is widely shared. Many

armed groups feel the CNDP is receiving special treatment, while their concerns are ignored. End comment).

GARVELINK